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#### **Any action the state takes inherently supports white supremacy – the plan’s action is coopted and redirected into state-sponsored violence**

Foundations of white supremacy are constantly re-secured in an obsessive fashion through a process of re-inventing via the tool of the state—political cataclysms that sought to shatter white supremacy from the state have been absorbed and coopted by the opposition—the 1AC views the state as an apparatus of violence, not the structure of gratuitous violence that makes their impact possible, turning the case

Martinot and Sexton, ’03 [2003, Steve Martinot is a profesor at San Francisco State University and Jared Sexton has a PhD in ethnic studies from UC Berkeley, Director, African American Studies at UC Irvine, “The Avant-garde of white supremacy,” http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/avantguard.htm]

The foundations of US white supremacy are far from stable. Owing to the instability of white supremacy, the social structures of whiteness must ever be re-secured in an obsessive fashion. The process of re-inventing whiteness and white supremacy has always involved the state, and the state has always involved the utmost paranoia. Vast political cataclysms such as the civil rights movements that sought to shatter this invention have confronted the state as harbingers of sanity. Yet the state’s absorption and co-optation of that opposition for the reconstruction of the white social order has been reoccurring before our very eyes. White supremacy is not reconstructed simply for its own sake, but for the sake of the social paranoia, the ethic of impunity, and the violent spectacles of racialization that it calls the "maintenance of order" all of which constitute its essential dimensions. The cold, gray institutions of this society—courts, schools, prisons, police, army, law, religion, the two-party system—become the arenas of this brutality, its excess and spectacle, which they then normalize throughout the social field. It is not simply by understanding the forms of state violence that the structures of hyper-injustice and their excess of hegemony will be addressed. If they foster policing as their paradigm—including imprisonment, police occupations, commodified governmental operations, a renewed Jim Crow, and a re-criminalization of race as their version of social order—then to merely catalogue these institutional forms marks the moment at which understanding stops. To pretend to understand at that point would be to affirm what denies understanding. Instead, we have to understand the state and its order as a mode of anti-production that seeks precisely to cancel understanding through its own common sense. For common sense, the opposite of injustice is justice; however, the opposite of hyper-injustice is not justice. The existence of hyper-injustice implies that neither a consciousness of injustice nor the possibility of justice any longer applies. Justice as such is incommensurable with and wholly exterior to the relation between ordinary social existence and the ethic of impunity including the modes of gratuitous violence that it fosters. The pervasiveness of state-sanctioned terror, police brutality, mass incarceration, and the endless ambushes of white populism is where we must begin our theorizing. Though state practices create and reproduce the subjects, discourses, and places that are inseparable from them, we can no longer presuppose the subjects and subject positions nor the ideologies and empiricisms of political and class forces. Rather, the analysis of a contingent yet comprehensive state terror becomes primary. This is not to debate the traditional concerns of radical leftist politics that presuppose (and close off) the question of structure, its tenacity, its systematic and inexplicable gratuitousness. The problem here is how to dwell on the structures of pervasiveness, terror, and gratuitousness themselves rather than simply the state as an apparatus. It is to ask how the state exists as a formation or confluence of processes with de-centered agency, how the subjects of state authority—its agents, citizens, and captives—are produced in the crucible of its ritualistic violence.

#### **The only ethical option is to call for an end to the world—calling attention to the antagonism that undergirds the US is the only way to address the conflicts within it**

The only ethical call for action is one that calls for the end of the world—the only ethical grammars draw attention not to the way in which space is used by powerful interests but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to exist, think, and act—calling the actions of the world is insufficient—we must call the world itself into question—only then can we address conflicts within the antagonism of America

Wilderson, ’10 [2010, Frank B. Wilderson is an Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”]

Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of their demands—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps their grammars are the only ethical grammars available to modern politics and modernity writ large, for they draw our attention not to the way in which space and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world’s capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage upon which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world to account but to call the world itself to account, and to account for them no less! The woman at Columbia was not demanding to be a participant in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather, she was articulating a triangulation between, on the one hand, the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to becoming a “being for the captor” (206), the drama of value (the stage upon which surplus value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale); and on the other, the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the world—and not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her “crazy.” And to what does the world attribute the Native American man’s insanity? “He’s crazy if he thinks he’s getting any money out of us”? Surely, that doesn’t make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun. What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico-political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely and unconsciously, as if by accident? Return Turtle Island to the “Savage.” Repair the demolished subjectivity of the Slave. Two simple sentences, thirteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled. An “ethical modernity” would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms: class struggle, gender conflict, immigrants rights. When pared down to thirteen words and two sentences, one cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of Left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (five hundred years and two hundred fifty million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences, these thirteen words not only render their speaker “crazy” but become themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, Left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable. In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not “Should the U.S. be overthrown?” or even “Would it be overthrown?” but rather when and how—and, for some, what—would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the U.S. writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King, Jr., prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of SDS, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of SNCC, to Bobbie Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic zeitgeist of the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground. Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of “success,” but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the U.S. was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (a U.S. attorney general and presidential candidate) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks.[[1]](#endnote-1) One could (and many did) acknowledge America’s strength and power. This seldom, however, rose to the level of an ethical assessment, but rather remained an assessment of the so-called “balance of forces.” The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to credibly wed the U.S. and ethics. The raw force of COINTELPRO put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and progressives who “retired” from struggle. The question’s echo lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM Warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the “crazies” shout at passers-by. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that affected a seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary zeitgeist. Is it still possible for a dream of unfettered ethics, a dream of the Settlement and the Slave estate’s[[2]](#endnote-2) destruction, to manifest itself at the ethical core of cinematic discourse, when this dream is no longer a constituent element of political discourse in the streets nor of intellectual discourse in the academy? The answer is “no” in the sense that, as history has shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed upon in screenplays and in scholarly prose; but “yes” in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptoms—it registers in both cinema and scholarship as symptoms of awareness of the structural antagonisms. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. But from 1980 to the present, Blackness and Redness manifests only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse, that is, as unspoken grammars. This grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic strategies/design), even when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict (that is, a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positionalities, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions). In other words, even when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the script insists are conceptually coherent (usually having to do with poverty or the absence of “family values”), the non-narrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontology—or non-ontology. The grammar of antagonism breaks in on the mendacity of conflict. Semiotics and linguistics teach us that when we speak, our grammar goes unspoken. Our grammar is assumed. It is the structure through which the labor of speech is possible.[[3]](#endnote-3) Likewise, the grammar of political ethics—the grammar of assumptions regarding the ontology of suffering—which underwrite Film Theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and which underwrite cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present) is also unspoken. This notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an ontological grammar, a structure of suffering. And the structure of suffering which film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume crowds out other structures of suffering, regardless of the sentiment of the film or the spirit of unity mobilized by the political discourse in question. To put a finer point on it, structures of ontological suffering stand in antagonistic, rather then conflictual, relation to one another (despite the fact that antagonists themselves may not be aware of the ontological positionality from which they speak). Though this is perhaps the most controversial and out-of-step claim of this book, it is, nonetheless, the foundation of the close reading of feature films and political theory that follows.

#### Maintaining the structures that uphold slavery culminates in extinction through continual attempts to destroy the other

We are SHATTERED, fragments of slavery, striving for a lost union and continually bursting apart with no flag on our undiscovered country due to the original accumulation of capital which in our refusal to remember creates a mode of repetition we call race. The modern world created by MURDERS has SHATTERED lives blood is money, money is capital, capital is nation and Nation is disguised in the phrase WE THE PEOPLE striving for a more perfect union, white people striving for the perfection of humanity, white or nothing as countless people of color ripen and fall, cease, season after season like falling leaves. Life becomes a commodity and the shattered fragments are pieced together in the form of its shattered parts, a RECONSTRUCTION, a world-destroying force, a puzzle that cannot be completed, the world shattering force of the original accumulation creating the grave we are already in, with all the eternity of the Middle Passage, the Black Atlantic, repetitions of the force that OPPOSED and SHATTERED, repetitions of the TOTAL EXTINCTION event at the beginning of what is modern. The invisible hand of the market and the SHATTERING force of race-making genocide WERE and ARE one and the same the continuity of DEATH and DEATH only.

Farley, ’10 [2010, James Campbell Farley is a Matthews Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence Albany Law School, Anthony Paul Farley, “SHATTERED: Afterword for Defining Race, A Joint Symposium of The Albany Law Review and the Albany Journal of Science and Technology”; Albany Law Review,, Vo. 72:1053]

What happened shattered whatever it was that we once were. Slavery happened.We are the fragments of that happening. And it is still happening. We the fragments are citizens of the undiscovered country. We the fragments, striving for a lost union, continually burst apart. Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* makes no mention of what happened. We will not find the flag of our undiscovered country within its binding, or on any pages written within capital’s long spell. Smith wrote of *previously* acquired capital. The origin of this previously acquired capital is made a mystery, a foundational mystery. This previously acquired capital is the navel of the modern world. Karl Marx, writing at the time of the 13th amendment’s novelty, described what happened at our beginning as “primitive accumulation”: I will call it the original accumulation, and I will call portraits of its repetitions primal scenes of accumulation: The discovery of gold and silver in the Americas, the extirpation and entombment in the mines of the indigenous populations..The beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India…and the conversion of Africa into commercial hunting grounds for the capture of black skins. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. *Defining Race* has been a symposium of definitions. I will begin the end of *Defining race* with a definition of race that is itself intended to bring race to an end: Race is the mode of repetition by which we refuse memories of the original accumulation. In what follows, I will show the place of all the essays of *Defining Race* within *this* definition of race. The world that is modern was made so by millions upon millions of murders. Lives and ways of living, forms of life, were shattered. Blood became money. Money became capital. Capital became nation. Nation is the perfect disguise for people, as in “We the people…” People, in other words, became white, or they failed to become anything at all. We who are not people, we who are in material fact less than nothing at all, we colors of those millions of murders merely ripen and fall and cease, season after unforgiving season, like falling leaves, with the original accumulation as the rhyme and the rhythm and the repressed reason. Reader, take note that what I have just offered is an order of things, but not a temporal order. Time ceases with the original accumulation. Life, at that point, call it the navel of the dream, becomes a commodity, a thing like any other thing, a thing to be bought or sold, and the logic that describes the commodity made out of the space for human development is the logic of capital. As promised above, what Marx called *primitive accumulation* I will designate with two terms, *original accumulation* and *primal scene of accumulation*. I will use the term *original accumulation* to discuss the traumatic moment that seems always to have occurred just before the curtains of history were raised, and I will use the term *primal scene of accumulation* to designate the always-tentative nature of our attempts to reconstruct that time-before-time. When a form of life is shattered the fragments come together in the form of the shattering force itself, not the form of life that was shattered. It is as if the fragments, each feeling in itself the lack of a former, albeit unrecognized, unity, are drawn to each other, but only in a way that preserves a certain lack. The lack is the shattering force itself. And the shattering is a certainty. The lack becomes the free-floating principle of reunification, and thus all attempts at reunification fail, in perpetuity. The lack about which I write is not a simple one. The lack is in fact the world-destroying force, the missing piece of all our reconstructions. The lack is the missing piece and world-destroying force that we are. It is always what we are becoming. Because we are that world-shattering force, the force of the original accumulation, whatever institutional film we wrap around that which we mistake for ourselves is doomed by the deadly contents that we ourselves are, both in ourselves and ourselves, albeit without conscious awareness. Time, vanquished by the original accumulation, now reappears as a never-ending puzzle we feel compelled to complete. Our puzzle cannot be completed, for what it depicts is the end of the world that has already ended. The puzzle that we feel mysteriously compelled to put back together is not whatever was before the original accumulation, it is instead the world-shattering force of that original accumulation. If it ever seems as if we have found the final piece of the institutional puzzle that is the achievement of social, industrial and perpetual peace, and it often seems so, then we can be as sure as the original accumulation, as certain as the grave we are already in, that the seemingly final piece will shatter everything: and it will do so with all the eternity of the Middle Passage, the Black Atlantic, the undiscovered country, our source and final resting place, the navel of our contemplations. The repetitions are not repetitions of a form of life, they are repetitions of the fore that opposed and shattered that form of life; they are repetitions of the original accumulation, of the total extinction event at the beginning of what is modern. The fragments come together in the form of the force that shattered the unit of their former life. That shattering force was the force of the original accumulation, and it shatters them again. Thus it is that we never cross the event-horizon of the original accumulation. The invisible hand of the market and the shattering force of race-making genocide were and are one and the same. The market is the ghostly return genocide. The word of the market, of capitalism, looks like life, “idyllic,” but it is not, not for the have-nots whose not-having is the secret source of all capital accumulation. Capitalism is the repetition and intensification of racial genocide of its origin. Repetition and intensification of the great death event of the world is not life; it is death, only death, and that continually. She comes in colors, like November.

### 2nc pluralism link

#### **The rhetoric of pluralist reform helps protect and maintain stability for black suffering that underwrites the foundation of the US—their legislative antics help civil society maintain legitimacy at the expense of Indians and Blacks**

Status quo intellectual protocols ignore the way ontology doesn’t permit us from understanding the being of the black man—ideas of civic participation is little more than a passionate dream that narrows the distance between the protester and the police—the fixation on specific unique experience of a myriad identities deals with conflicts within America and hides the suffering that underwrites the antagonism of America—their antics help civil society recuperate and maintain stability

* Inclusion is insufficient – attempts at diversity offer a way out of recognizing the grammar of suffering that underlies all of contemporary life

Wilderson, ’10 [2010, Frank B. Wilderson is an Associate Professor of African-American Studies at UC Irvine and has a Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, “Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms,”]

The difficulty of writing a book which seeks to uncover Red, Black, and White socially engaged feature films as aesthetic accompaniments to grammars of suffering, predicated on the subject positions of the “Savage” and the Slave is that today’s intellectual protocols are not informed by Fanon’s insistence that “ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man [sic]” (Black Skin, White Masks 110). In sharp contrast to the late 60s and early 70s, we now live in a political, academic, and cinematic milieu which stresses “diversity,” “unity,” “civic participation,” “hybridity,” “access,” and “contribution.” The radical fringe of political discourse amounts to little more than a passionate dream of civic reform and social stability. The distance between the protester and the police has narrowed considerably. The effect of this upon the academy is that intellectual protocols tend to privilege two of the three domains of subjectivity, namely preconscious interests (as evidenced in the work of social science around “political unity,” “social attitudes,” “civic participation,” and “diversity,”) and unconscious identification (as evidenced in the humanities’ postmodern regimes of “diversity,” “hybridity,” and “relative [rather than “master”] narratives”). Since the 1980s, intellectual protocols aligned with structural positionality (except in the work of die-hard Marxists) have been kicked to the curb. That is to say, it is hardly fashionable anymore to think the vagaries of power through the generic positions within a structure of power relations—such as man/woman, worker/boss. Instead, the academy’s ensembles of questions are fixated on specific and “unique” experience of the myriad identities that make up those structural positions. This would be fine if the work led us back to a critique of the paradigm; but most of it does not. Again, the upshot of this is that the intellectual protocols now in play, and the composite effect of cinematic and political discourse since the 1980s, tend to hide rather than make explicit the grammar of suffering which underwrites the US and its foundational antagonisms. This state of affairs exacerbates—or, more precisely, mystifies and veils—the ontological death of the Slave and the “Savage” because (as in the 1950s) cinematic, political, and intellectual discourse of the current milieu resists being sanctioned and authorized by the irreconcilable demands of Indigenism and Blackness—academic enquiry is thus no more effective in pursuing a revolutionary critique than the legislative antics of the loyal opposition. This is how Left-leaning scholars help civil society recuperate and maintain stability. But this stability is a state of emergency for Indians and Blacks.

### sov link

#### tag

Chowdry and Rai 9, Professors of International Studies

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At first glance, the field of IR has hardly any parallels to the racial realism/colorblindness discussed above. Conventional IR do not claim any position on race, much less a colorblind position; indeed there is a “well-trained silence” around issues of race (Persaud 2002:58). However, much like the ontological maneuvers of racial realists that lead them to their objectivity claims, the well-trained silence of IR emerges from epistemological and ontological maneuvers in the discipline that replicate the colorblind position that we refer to. We suggest that while there is an alleged colorblindness to the discipline, issues of race and gender are systemically coded into some of the concepts such as the nation-state and sovereignty that are central to the discipline. Arguably, the focus of conventional IR on nation-states depends upon neither the inclusion nor the exclusion of race or racialized subjects. However, the centrality of the Westphalian state and the principle of sovereignty as the constitutive pillars of disciplinary authority and legitimacy in IR lead to several racialized inclusions and exclusions. Karena Shaw (2002) and Sankaran Krishna (2001), amongst others, discuss the ways in which the nation-state and sovereignty determine these inclusions and exclusions. Shaw examines the constitution and legitimation of disciplinary authority in IR by focusing on the exclusion of indigenous peoples from IR. For Shaw, the “preconditions established by the assumption of sovereignty as the grounds of analyses” in IR “provides the basic tension that any attempt to include indigenous peoples in disciplinary conversations must negotiate” (Shaw 2002:64). Acknowledging that the focus on sovereignty excludes yet to be decolonized indigenous peoples from the disciplinary boundaries, she also suggests that the efforts of scholars such as Franke Wilmer (1993) and Neta Crawford (1994) to seek inclusion of native voices in IR based on the terms of sovereignty limit their analysis. According to Shaw, Wilmer’s analysis on how indigenous voices are moving towards inclusion in IR does not take into account the fact that indigenous peoples “have not been incidental frills at the edges of but have always been central to IR—both as a discipline and as practices of politics among nations” (Shaw 2002:68). For example, Shaw suggests that the role of international law, primarily through the doctrine of terra nullius, in the violence and dispossessions enacted upon indigenous peoples remind us of how racialized difference was used in the theft of land and to deny sovereignty to indigenous nations. In addition, she reminds us that “the active marginalization of indigenous peoples has been necessary for IR to appear and function” (Shaw 2002:68). Another example of the ways in which the sovereignty abstraction of IR erases significant histories is provided by Krishna (2001). Remarking on the horrendous violence engendered by European powers during the misnamed Hundred Years of Peace (1815–1914), Krishna suggests the claim of peace for the period between 1815 and 1914 could only be made by relying on the abstraction of sovereignty. As the colonized were not perceived as sovereign entities, the violence against them during their occupation did not merit an accounting in the peace narrative. In addition to these claims of Krishna, it is important to note that the racialized and gendered construction of Africa, Asia, and the Americas as barbaric and uncivilized played an equally important role in the ontological maneuvers of the sovereignty narrative. Colonization became mission civilisatrice and references to the white man’s burden exorcised any repugnance for the inhumane practices associated with it. The history of the sovereign modern state in Europe is thus deeply embedded in the history of the imperial project of Europe. While most accounts of the history of modernity including the modern state claim a linear chronology, beginning with its origins in Europe and then its dissemination to the rest of the world, postcolonial scholars suggest the mutual constitution of the “West and the rest” in which the nation state and its identity emerge in the context of the “imperial social formation.”6 The state-centeredness of the sovereignty narrative rests on the assumption of an anarchical world in which sovereign nation states negotiate their interests, sovereignty being the alleged equalizing concept in IR. In this narrative, the sovereign state is thus projected as the universal and highest form of authority in the anarchical world system dissimilating its Eurocentric, hierarchical and violent origins. “Indeed, reflection on the past 300 or so years—since Westphalia—indicates that the dominant political form has in any case been the imperial state and empire rather than the sovereign state” (Laffey and Weldes 2004:125). Race(ing) the Global Security Imaginary: Identity, Nation, and Citizenship In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the United States of America unleashed “a war on terror” strongly supported by Britain, Spain, and Australia. While these events and what followed have been discussed by numerous scholars, we discuss briefly the “new” global security imaginary that emerged in the post-9/11 world. We conceptualize the global security imaginary as “a way of naming, ordering and representing” international security (Mälksoo 2006). It is this imaginary that draws boundaries, constructs identities and danger, and performs security (see Muppidi 1999; Weldes 1999). We suggest that the two conventional pillars of IR—the nation-state and sovereignty—remain central to the construction of this imaginary leading to a renewed interest in issues of national identity and citizenship in metropolitan centers. In the previous section, we have discussed the ways in which race is foundational to the sovereignty narrative. In this section we draw on Burton et al.’s engagement with the “imperial turn” to discuss the ways in which a racialized global security imaginary which serves the needs of metropolitan centers recuperates and reinscribes race into IR in significant ways through the twin concept of the nation-state. While the nation-state and sovereignty are constitutive of conventional IR, it generally treats the nation-state as given and does not take seriously questions regarding its construction, its nature, and its identity. However, critical interventions into IR (based on the historical sociology and anthropology of the state) interrogate the nation-state project and suggest that the nation is not based on pre-existing identities; rather the state inscribes “an imagined political community” to legitimize its national and sovereign status (Anderson 1983). The importance of understanding the nation as an imagined, political, cultural, and social project cannot be overstated for it demonstrates that the nation is not pre-given but is constructed and needs to constantly produce and reproduce itself (Campbell 1990). The construction of the imagined political community relies on the construction of a noncommunity, the “other,” the enemy, and maintenance of internal and external boundaries based on these constructions. Race, ethnicity, gender, religion, caste, class, and so on are crucial elements in the constructions of national boundaries, working particularly through the concept of citizenship. The concept of citizenship defines who belongs to the nation and who does not; those who do not belong could be both within and outside the nation. Citizenship uses race, for instance, as an exclusionary mechanism to maintain the territorial integrity and identity of the nation legally and metaphorically defining those who really belong to the “imagined community” and others who are excluded from this community.

### perm answer

Medina 11 – prof @ Vanderbilt

(Jose, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism, Foucault Studies, No. 12, pp. 9-35, October 2011)

In the second place, by undoing established historical continuities, a counter- history reflects and produces discontinuous moments in a people’s past, gaps that are passed over in silence, interstices in the socio-historical fabric of a community that have received no attention. This is what we can call, by symmetry with the previous point, the principle of discontinuity. Foucault describes it in the following way: This counter-history “also breaks the continuity of glory.” It reveals that the light—the famous dazzling effect of power—is not something that petrifies, solidifies, and immobilizes the entire social body, and thus keeps it in order; it is in fact a divisive light that illuminates one side of the social body but leaves the other side in shadow or casts it into darkness. A counter-history is the dark history of those peoples who have been kept in the shadows, a history that speaks ‚from within the shadows,‛ ‚the discourse of those who have no glory, or of those who have lost it and who now find themselves, perhaps for a time—but probably for a long time—in darkness and silence.‛14 A counter-his- tory is not the history of victories, but the history of defeats. As Foucault remarks, it is linked to those ‚epic, religious, or mythical forms which “formulate the misfortune of ancestors, exiles, and servitude;‛ it ‚is much closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans.‛15 While an official history keeps entire groups of peoples and their lives and experiences ‚in darkness and silence,‛ a counter-history teaches us precisely how to listen to those silent and dark moments. But how do we learn to listen to silence? In an earlier essay, ‚What is an Author?,‛16 Foucault offers helpful remarks about how to fight against the ‘omissions‛ and active oblivion produced by discursive practices, that is, how to listen to lost voices that have been silenced or coopted in such a way that certain meanings were lost or never heard. Foucault is particularly interested in those forms of silencing produced by a discursive practice which, far from being accidental, are in fact foundational and constitutive. Those are constitutive silences, for the discursive practice proceeds in the way it does and acquires its distinctive normative structure by virtue of the exclusions that it produces, by virtue of those silenced voices and occluded meanings that let the official voices and meanings dominate the discursive space. Omissions and silences are foundational, a constitutive part of ‚the origin‛ or ‚the initiation‛ of a discursive practice. For that reason, the fight against those exclusions requires ‚a return to the origin‛: If we return, it is because of a basic and constructive omission that is not the result of accident or incomprehension.” This non-accidental omission must be regulated by precise operations that can be situated, analyzed, and reduced in a return to the act of initiation.17 Foucault distinguishes this critical ‚return to the origin‛ from mere ‚rediscoveries‛ and mere ‚reactivations‛: a rediscovery promotes ‚the perception of forgotten or obscured figures;‛18 and a reactivation involves ‚the insertion of discourse into totally new domains of generalization, practices, and transformation.‛19 By contrast, an attempt to transform a discursive practice deeply from the inside by resisting its silences and omissions requires a ‚return to the origin.‛ This critical return involves revisiting the texts that have come to be considered foundational, ‚the primary points of reference‛ of the practice, and developing a new way of reading them, so as to train our eyes and ears to new meanings and voices: we pay ‚particular attention to those things registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading plenitude.‛20 Foucault emphasizes that the modifications introduced by this critical return to the origin are not merely ‚a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and re- double it in the form of an ornament which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice.‛21 If rediscoveries and reactivations of the past are crucial for extending discursive practices, a ‚return to the origin‛ that unveils omissions and silences is what is required for a deep transformation of our meaning-making capacities within those practices. The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences, to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frame- works. Lacking that ability is a strong indication of one’s inability to resist epistemic and socio-political subjugation, of the limitations on one’s agency and positionality within discursive practices. And the ability to inhabit discursive practices critically that we develop by becoming sensitive to exclusions—by listening to silences— enables us not to be trapped into discursive practices, that is, it gives us also the ability to develop counter-discourses. Indeed, being able to negotiate historical narratives and to resist imposed interpretations of one’s past means being able to develop counter-histories. Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledge: it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices of those peoples who have lived their life ‚in darkness and silence.‛

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#### Dogmatism – the insistence that we always discuss \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ devolves debate into polemics and dogmatism – creates a violent and unproductive model of communication

Foucault, ’84

(Michel, “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations” Interview by Paul Rabinow, http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html)

I like discussions, and when I am asked questions, I try to answer them. It’s true that I don’t like to get involved in polemics. If I open a book and see that the author is accusing an adversary of “infantile leftism” I shut it again right away. That’s not my way of doing things; I don’t belong to the world of people who do things that way. I insist on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the one that concerns the search for truth and the relation to the other.

In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game—a game that is at once pleasant and difficult—in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.

The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.

Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn’t dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theater. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects. Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights that they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one’s killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to the truth by such paths and thus to validate, even if in a merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn’t even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debate in the USSR over linguistics or genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all—they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.

1. After the Watts Rebellion, RFK observed: “There is no point in telling Negroes to observe the law…It has almost always been used against them…All these places—Harlem, Watts, South Side [of Chicago]—are riots wating to happen.” Quote in: Clark, Kenneth B. “The Wonder is There Have Been So Few Riots.” *New York Times Magazine*, September 5, 1965. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. “Slave estate” is a term borrowed from Hortense Spillers. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. See Emile Benveniste. *Problems in General Linguistics*. Trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek. Coral Gables: Univ. of Miami Press, 1971. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)